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วันเสาร์ที่ 16 มิถุนายน พ.ศ. 2550

Phan Nguyen Hong, Quan Thi Quynh Dao, Le Kim Thoa


With 13,000 floral species and over 15,000 faunal species, three newly discovered big animal species, and a ratio of country/world species of 6.3%, Vietnam has enormous tourism—particularly ecotourism—potential. In fact, since 1986, when Doi Moi (renovation reforms) began the shift from a centrally planned to a socialist-oriented market, or multi-sectoral, economy, tourism has been an sector of primary concern to the government. In May 1995, the prime minister of Vietnam approved a master plan of tourism development for the period 1995-2010. In February 1999, the state decree on tourism was part of the socio-economic development strategy for the period 2001-2010 approved at the IX National Congress of the Party: “Tourism development has become a spearhead economic industry indeed. It is necessary to improve the quality and effectiveness of tourism activities, bringing into full play the natural conditions, and cultural and historical tradition to meet the domestic and international demand for tourism and to catch up with tourism development in the region” (Document of the IX National Congress 2001).


Tourism has so far brought great benefits to the economy, but it has also contributed to environmental degradation, especially biodiversity deterioration. Thus, the concept of “sustainable development”—development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs—must be factored into tourism development. This consideration is reflected in the term “ecotourism,” which is referred to variously as ecological or environmental tourism, nature or green tourism, sustainable or responsible tourism.


Ecotourism involves travel to relatively undisturbed natural areas with the specific object of studying, admiring, and enjoying scenery, plants, and animals, as well as any cultural features found in these areas. It is distinguished from mass or resort tourism by its lower impact on the environment, lower infrastructure requirements, and its role in educating tourists about natural environments and cultural values.


Fully aware of its significance, the government of Vietnam has prioritized ecotourism in its strategy for tourism development to ensure both sustainability and economic benefits. Though ecotourism in Vietnam is at a beginning stage of development, it is expected to grow strongly through support from government and international organizations.


Natural resources potential


Vietnam is both a “cradle” of native species and a transitional area of organisms from the biota of the north (Himalaya-south China), the south (Malaysia-Indonesia) and the west (India-Myanmar) (Khanh 1999). Moreover, due to its diversity of topography and climatic conditions, Vietnam is rich in floral and faunal species, of which 10 percent and 11 percent, respectively, are endemic. The three big animal species that have been recently discovered in Vietnam are “Sao la” (Pseudoryx nghetinhensis) in 1992, “Mang lon” (Megamuntiacus vuquangensis) in 1993, and “Mang Truong Son” (Muntiacus truongsonensis) in 1996. Indeed, Vietnam is considered one of sixteen countries with the highest biodiversity in a wide range of ecosystems (WCMC 1962)—a very favorable condition for ecotourism development.


Coastal ecosystems: Vietnam’s 3260 km of coastline hosts a variety of coastal ecosystems. The number of seagrass species in Vietnam ranks second only to the Philippines within ASEAN. Seagrass beds are increasingly abundant from north to south and are home to 125 benthic species and 158 seaweed species (Tien 2000). Sea cow (Dugong dugong or manatee)—an animal species in danger of extinction—can be found in the Con Dao seagrass bed.


Coral reef ecosystems are already attractive to ecotourists, with resorts established at Cat Ba Island, Co To, Bach Long Vi, Con Co, Hon Son Tra-Hai Van, Con Dao, Phu Quoc, and islands in Khanh Hoa province. Divers can observe colorful coral reefs with a wide range of flora and fauna. Coral reef samples are exploited for tourist souvenirs in the provinces of Quang Ninh, Nha Trang, and Con Dao (Tien 2000). Species composition is rich: about 95 species of 35 genera in Northern coastal areas and 255 species of 69 genera in Southern coastal areas. These include 180 phytoplankton, 97 zooplankton, 70 seaweed, 78 polychaeta, 208 mollusk, 76 crustacean, and 157 fish species (Yet 1998, cited in Tuan 2000).


The National Environment Agency of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (2000) lists 79 wetland areas of national importance (Hughes et al. (eds.) 2001). Among them are lagoon ecosystems, found only in Central Vietnam (Tam Giang-Cau Hai, Tra O, Truong Giang, O Loan, Thuy Trieu, Thi Nai, and Nuoc Ngot). Lagoons are very high in biodiversity with a high level of nutrition. As one of the biggest lagoons in the world, Tam Giang-Cau Hai Lagoon (21,000 ha) has as many as 55 species of seaweed. Fish, shrimp, and crabs of economic value include Mugil cephalus, Siganus guttatus, Penaeus monodon, Scylla serrata, and Portunus pelagicus. Hundreds of tons of mollusks are harvested annually (Hoi et al. 1995, 1996). Lagoons in Vietnam also contain mineral resources of high value, help regulate the local climate, and can become ideal tourist destinations.


Wetland areas of obvious tourist interest are coastal sandy ecosystems. The total area of sandy beaches in Vietnam is 170 km2. According to Mai Sy Tuan (2000), flora found here are not rich in species composition, mainly shrubs and succulent grass such as Pandanus tectorius, Agave americana, Euphorbia antiquorum, Opuntia sp., Sesuvium porlulacastrum, and Casuarina equisetifolia. There is a globe-shaped grass species, Spinifex littoreus, with infruitescence resembling a porcupine, which, when ripe, roll along sandy beaches to the delight of children. On hot sunny days, you can lie on hammocks under the Casuarina equisetifolia forest listening to the wind singing or eat seafood such as squid, blue crabs, mud crabs, and banana shrimps. Other marine species commonly found are uca, mollusks, amphibians, reptiles, and birds. Most notably, this ecosystem provides a breeding ground for some turtle species in danger of extinction. Among the many beautiful sandy beaches in Vietnam are Cat Ba Island, Tra Co, Bai Chay (Quang Ninh Province), Do Son (Hai Phong City), Dong Chau (Thai Binh), Hai Thinh (Nam Dinh Province), Sam Son (Thanh Hoa Province), Cua Lo (Nghe An Province), Thien Cam (Ha Tinh Province), Lang Co (Thua Thien Hue Province), Ngu Hanh Son (Da Nang City), Nha Trang (Khanh Hoa), Phan Thiet (Ninh Thuan), and Vung Tau.


Vietnam’s diversified mangrove forests suffered greatly during the two Indochina wars. In recent years, mangrove reforestation efforts have been made by many groups, ranging from central and local governments to NGOs and other international organizations. A typical example is Can Gio Mangroves (described in the case study below), designated by UNESCO as the first Biosphere Reserve in Vietnam on 21 January 2000 and included in the world network of Biosphere Reserves.


Ca Mau mangrove forest in the extreme south features houses of built in traditional Tay Nguyen style and seven other simple Nypa palm (a mangrove species) thatched huts and a small pathway leading to the mangroves. Though infrastructure is still poor, the area attracts 3,000 tourists per month (People’s Newspaper, 11 September 2002). The Xuan Thuy Ramsar Convention Nature Reserve supports a great variety of faunal and floral species, including nine threatened and near-threatened bird species. Most notably, 26 percent of the world’s black-faced spoonbill and 2 percent of the Larus saudersi can be seen here (Birdlife 2001).


Limestone ecosystems: Limestone mountains are distributed mostly from the north to Quang Binh. These mountains of evergreen forests have vivid fauna and flora species. They are also home to the distinctive cultures represented by some of Vietnam’s ethnic minorities. Vo Tri Chung (2002) stated that limestone mountains contain many historical vestiges of human civilization, social development, and protection of the country. Visitors can hike in limestone mountains in the Cat Ba, Ba Be, and Cuc Phuong National Parks and the Phong Nha-Ke Bang and Paco-Hangkia Nature Reserves.


Special use forest system: According to the Tourism Development Research Institute, the special use forest system includes eleven national parks of 259,797 ha; sixty-one nature reserves of 1,692,351 ha; and thirty-four environmental, historical, and cultural forests of 147,886 ha. The total area of special use forests in Vietnam is 3,100,034 ha, accounting for 28.4 percent of total forest land (10,915,592 ha).


Some national parks are located in remote areas, such as the Pu Mat and the Ben En national parks; others lie along national roads or near big cities with convenient transportation suitable for ecotourism development. They are Ba Vi national park (Ha Tay province), Cuc Phuong national park (Ninh Binh province), Cat Ba national park (Hai Phong province), Tam Dao national park (Vinh Phuc province), Bach Ma national park (Thua Thien Hue province), and Nam Cat Yien national park (Dong Nai Province).


In recent years, the government of Vietnam has invested in improving infrastructure and investigating the floral, faunal, geological, and geomorphological characteristics of national parks. These areas have become research sites for the maintenance of biodiversity samples. Therefore many universities and research institutions have organized visits for students, cadres, and foreigners. We hope the open door policy of sustainable tourism development will continue to channel appropriate investment to national parks in order to welcome nature reseachers to Vietnam.


Since 1987, the establishment of special use forests increased thanks to interest from the central to local levels, the cooperation of scientists and researchers, and the coordination and assistance of international organizations and NGOs. It is in these forests that ecotourism should continue to be developed for both their natural and their cultural value.


Fruit gardens: Lying in the tropical region, Vietnam has many varieties of fruit trees, especially in the Mekong river delta, where warm weather favors year-round tree growth. After hard-working days in noisy urban areas, visitors can walk in gardens of diversified fruits of many colors and sample the simple, peaceful life closely associated with the river. One newly emerged ecotourist village is My Khanh village, about 10 km from Can Tho City in the southwest. It is a fruit garden located on 40,000 m2 with many canals and creeks, floating markets, traditional (“rong”) style guesthouses, and stocked lakes for fishing and boating. It is a good place for visitors interested in culinary culture, local fruit specialties, traditional production of noodles, wine, young sticky rice, mat weaving, and rice grinding (Sai Gon Economics Time 2002).


Cultural integrity potential


Vietnam is rich in culture identity, with fifty-four peoples whose indigenous knowledge should also be accessible to visitors. One of the principles of ecotourism is to preserve cultural integrity because human value cannot be separated from natural value. As most potential ecotourist sites are inhabited by ethnic minorities, the principle of “encouraging community participation in ecotourism activities” should both create income and help maintain cultural identity. These communities have a deep understanding of traditional festivals, cultivation and land use customs, culinary culture, traditional lifestyle and handicrafts, and historical places. A trip to the limestone mountain of Cao Bang-Bac Kan, for example, is valuable not only for the natural Ba Be Lake, but for the opportunity to learn about cultivation customs, dying practices using endemic plants to produce brocading (Cham weaving), and traditional handmade boats of precious timber collected in the forest.


Cultural value is also represented in Vietnam’s approximately 100 traditional festivals. The Nghinh Ong Festival—to worship “Whale”—is the biggest festival of coastal fishermen in Vietnam (Canh 2002). Other distinctive celebrations are the “Spring” festival of Thai and Muong ethnic minorities and elephant racing and buffalo festivals in Tay Nguyen.


The reality of ecotourism in Vietnam today


According to Nguyen Van De (2002), there was a 7.1-fold increase in international tourist visits from 300,000 in 1991 to 2.14 million in 2000; domestic tourism experienced a 7.5 fold rise, from 1.5 million to 11.3 million visits. This is a high rate of increase compared to other countries in the region, bringing international tourism in Vietnam to a near equal level with the Philippines and to about one quarter of that of Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.


Those referred to as ecotourists account for over 30% of international and nearly 50% of domestic tourists (Luong 1999). Tam Dao National Park receives 120,000-150,000 visitors every year (Tien 2002). Tourism in Nam Cat Tien is restricted, but still some thousands of mostly young people visit this area. Meanwhile, ecotourists to Ha Long Bay number 400,000. Ecotourism has been increasing in recent years, with domestic visitors rising more rapidly than international ones, accounting for up to 9.5 million people in 1998 (Luong 2000). Most ecotourists are adventurous young people and researchers who focus on national parks and nature reserves.



Source: Luong 2000


Because ecotourism is important for environmental education, maintenance of indigenous culture, and local economic development, both investment and government encouragement are required. Fillion et al. (1992, cited in Ceballos-Lascurain 1996, cited in Le Van Lanh 1999) estimated that international ecotourism generated USD 93-233 billion in 1988, and in fact, most nature reserves in the world are dependent on ecotourism revenues. But ecotourism also needs investment in human resources (especially tourist guides), management, and fundamental research and planning focused on the natural environment of proposed ecotourism sites. Investors at home and abroad have preferred to focus on infrastructure like hotels and restaurants. What investment does exist goes mainly to national parks and nature reserves and comes from the state budget through the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and from international organizations like WWF and the governments of the Netherlands, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Total capital investment in national parks and nature reserves from 1994 to 1999 was VND 71.1 billion (USD 1.1 million today). According to the Institute of Tourism Research and Development’s 1999 investigation, visitor entrance fees generated VND 386.2 (USD 25,150) million for reinvestment in infrastructure, conservation, and forestry development (Luong 2000).


Poor and uncoordinated management and organization of ecotourism have limited the development of this sector. Most resorts—beaches and other popular sites—are under the management of provincial tourism departments. In nature reserves and national parks, there is coordination between management boards and tourism corporations, which make investments in infrastructure and enjoy partial profits collected from fees. But there are often too many overlapping jurisdictions. For example, special use forests are managed by the forestry sector. The management boards of National Parks are under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development; those of Nature Reserves and Cultural, Historical and Environmental Forests are under Provincial and City People’s Committees. In Con Dao National Park, the local units involved in tourism are the district government, Con Dao National Park, tourism managers, military units, and local fishermen. According to new regulations governing the management of special use forests promulgated according to Decision No. 08/2001/QD-TTg by the prime minister (November 11, 2001), the Ministry of Culture and Information in coordination with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development is responsible for establishing and managing Cultural, Historical and Environmental Forests.


This tangled web of oversight has yielded no national strategy for ecotourism in Vietnam. And although tourist routes have been set up, no zoning plans have clearly delineated areas for ecotourism activites in national parks and nature reserves.


Is it really ecotourism?


Vietnam’s natural and cultural potential for ecotourism is well established. However, based on the following principles of ecotourism (Luong 1999), the economic activity occurring in Vietnam is only a type of nature-based tourism.


Principle 1: “Educating tourists on the natural environment to raise their awareness and get them involved in conservation work.” Who is responsible for environmental education? The tourist guides, managers, and other ecotourism staff. But in fact, most of these people do not have sufficient environmental training or indigenous knowledge to engage in education work. Research by Pham Trung Luong (2000) shows that 90 percent of ecotourist guides lack environmental knowledge (80 percent about flora and fauna species, 80 percent about natural resources typical in their area), and 88 percent would benefit from ecotourism guidebooks written especially for them. An illustration of wasted potential caused by this lack of training is Ha Long Bay, a world heritage site with immense environmental value—coral reefs, limestone mountains, thousands of flora and fauna species of high biodiversity—and rich cultural identity. But tourists in Ha Long Bay are presently visiting only the Bay and some caves, not accessing environmental information or local cultural activities. In general, the full potential of ecotourism has not yet been reached.


Principle 2: “Protecting the environment and maintaining vulnerable ecosystems.” Ecotourism should be associated with sustainable development, human love for nature, and protection of the environment. Nevertheless, much tourism is still spontaneous and lacking in management and visitor regulations. Some tourists are not fully aware of environmental protection and reluctant to pay conservation fees. If they throw rubbish or cut tree branches, they are not fined. As a result, some tourist areas have suffered serious environmental degradation, such as Huong Pagoda (Ha Tay province). And since there have been few Environmental Impact Assessments, the consequences of ecotourist activities are not clearly understood.


Principles 3 and 4: “Maintaining and promoting cultural identity and involving local communities in ecotourism.” International vistors to Vietnam often like to visit ethnic minority villages to observe the culture, meet local people, and participate in traditional activities. The ethnic minorities who live in or near nature reserves maintain distinctive lifestyles, cultural identities, and traditional customs. These features are part of the real value of ecotourism. However, local people are not much involved in ecotourism, and most tourist guides have poor knowledge of the indigenous culture. Therefore, ecotourists get no exposure to Vietnam’s diverse cultural identities. This is a limitation that must be overcome.


In addition, local people still live in poverty, their life closely associated with natural resources. The economic benefits of ecotourism need to be shared with them, but this will not happen without community participation. China provides a positive example: a questionnaire survey by Dr. Li Wenjun (2002) showed that most residents in Jiuzhaigou Biosphere Reserve, China, have been involved in the tourist business and its relevant jobs. Participation includes operating a family hotel, restaurant, or gift shop; renting yaks, sheep, and traditional ethnic dress to visitors for photographs; working for hotels, restaurants, or tour companies; and collecting garbage in tourist areas. The family hotel business is the main income source for residents.


Case Study: Can Gio Mangrove Biosphere Reserve


Can Gio Mangrove Biosphere Reserve (CGMBR) is a rehabilitated mangrove area located within Can Gio district in the Southeast. It covers 73,000 ha including nearly 40,000 ha of mangroves. This area was largely destroyed during the war, particularly in the period 1962-1970. Restoration was begun in 1978 by the government of Ho Chi Minh City with labor provided by local people and city organizations. It became a biosphere reserve recognized by MAB/UNESCO in 2000.


Located only 40 km from downtown Ho Chi Minh City, with the great diversity of fauna and flora typical of tropical mangrove ecosystems, and with great historical and cultural traditions, Can Gio is becoming a favorite recreation/tourism destination for residents of the Ho Chi Minh City area.


Natural and social background: Can Gio is uniquely valuable for its diversity—72 mangrove plant species, including 30 true and 42 associate mangrove species belonging to 10 main plant communities occupying newly formed mudflats along rivers, firm mudflats flooded by spring tides, highland sandy clay, abandoned salt pans, and brackish water areas. Some of the mangrove are rare species listed in the Vietnam Red Book, such as Lumnizera littorea and Aegiceras florida (Tuan et al. 2002). The 440 fauna species (Hong et al. 1996; Nhuong 2000, cited in Tri et al. 2000:14-15) include 118 invertebrate macro benthic, 134 fish, 9 amphibian, 30 reptile, 130 bird, and 19 mammal species (Hong et al. 2000). All of these are located in a complex and beautiful network of natural rivers and canals.


Can Gio also has a remarkable history. Archaeological evidence indicates that a relatively developed socio-economic life existed in this area in the first millennium BCE related to offshore shipping and trade with other regions. During the war years (1968-1975), this area was well known as a resistance base; the Special Water Task Force was responsible for famous victories costing the enemy great losses in war equipment and soldiers on Long Tau river. The fishing community in Can Gio also has a yearly festival to welcome the “king-fish,” a day of reunion for all local people.


Tourism in Can Gio: Recreational visits to Can Gio started spontaneously in the mid-1990s as students from the city came to visit the beach and see monkeys on the weekends. There were neither entrance fees nor services. In 2000, a new bridge was completed across the Dan Xay river, facilitating transport from Ho Chi Minh City to Can Gio town, and the Forest Park was handed over to Sai Gon tourist company. Since then, tourism in the area has been highly promoted to city residents.


There are three main tourist features in Can Gio. The Forest Park is home to a mischievous 600-member natural monkey troupe, a semi-natural crocodile pool, a historical museum, and a newly restored model of a Vietnamese army base. Visitors enjoy walking under the cool mangrove canopy and playing with the monkeys or sitting in the former army base recalling battles against enemies. Food and drink are available in the park-owned restaurant.


The Vam Sat site includes a bat sanctuary in the flooded Rhizophora area and a bird sanctuary containing over 10 species listed in the Red Book. Here visitors and scientists can find a diverse three-level fauna system: birds at the top, mammals in the middle, and aquatic organisms, including sea and brackish water species, at the lower level. A 58m observation tower helps visitors enjoy the whole scene.


The April 30th Beach is located in the transition zone near Can Gio town. Although the long beach is not of high quality, it is near the city and features cheap local seafood, which can be enjoyed under the canopy of a nice stretch of casuarina trees. In the town itself, people can visit the mausoleum/tomb of General-Fish, a respectable traditional character of the Can Gio fishing community.


Tourism in Can Gio is in the process of transformation from a spontaneous to a professional format. Visitors are mainly residents of Ho Chi Minh City seeking relaxation, fresh air, and a natural environment as a respite from work in the busy city. Most go to the Forest Park and the beach, the numbers rising quickly from 27,213 in 1997 (Sinh 1999) to almost 230,000 in 2001. It is estimated that around 80 percent come from Ho Chi Minh City, 5 percent from the local area, 1 percent from abroad, and the remainder from other nearby provinces.


As at many other nature-tourist sites in Vietnam, educational activities are limited. Vam Sat provides visitors with basic knowledge of the ecosystem of mangrove fauna and flora, and has therefore attracted a good number of scientists and true eco-tourists. But this site has not attracted a lot of casual visitors because its lack of large car parks and long travel time by boat makes its travel cost relatively higher than the other Can Gio sites.


Can Gio district, together with city’s Department of Tourism, is planning to increase tourist sites in Can Gio in both quantity and area to make tourism the leading economic sector of the district and a strong point of the city. Tentative additions include ecological training tours, a picnic site for the city’s young people, the Sac Forest naval site, orchards, and historical sites (Department of Tourism 2002).


Management of tourism in Can Gio: The management of tourism in Can Gio is rather complex, involving both public and private parties. Two big tourist companies based in Ho Chi Minh City operate in the area—the Sai Gon Tourist Cooperation (SGT) and Phu Tho Tourist. The district’s trading company and some private enterprises operate restaurants, guest houses, and private car parks. At least 100 local families operate seafood shops, souvenir shops, drinks stands, and chair rentals. Businesses related to transportation along the main road from Ho Chi Minh City—motorcycles, buses, the ferry, and shops—also benefit from tourism development.


The management board for Can Gio protected mangrove forests, some forestry plantations, and the district’s organisations in Can Gio are planning tourist businesses of various types. And the newly established management board for April 30th Beach (under the district People’s Committee) controls the operation of shops and security there.


The impact of tourism: At the moment and in general, the impact of tourism on the local economy and society is positive. Some local community members have seen their income increase and their living standards improve through employment in beach services, in businesses along the main road, or in the big tourist companies. The most visible and general benefit to the local community is improvement in the local infrastructure. The new bridge, good roads, and electricity which support tourism also improve the life of local people.


But eco-tourism in Can Gio is also having some negative impact on the environment and the community. With the number of visitors increasingly rapidly, beach pollution is becoming a problem. Waste is collected each morning; for the rest of the day, refuse from food and drink shops are thrown into the beach creating unhygienic conditions. The operation of shops and services by local people who lack knowledge of tourism and business practices has led to unfair competition among the food sellers and chair renters and to social evils such as fighting.


To make this sector socially healthy and sustainable, local people involved in tourism and tourist company employees should be reorganized and given training in sustainable eco-tourism. A good management board should also be established to control the activities of all stakeholders and ensure their activities do not go beyond the permitted level.


Recommendations


There are four main areas that deserve priority in improving eco-tourism in Vietnam:


1. Concerned bodies from the local to the central levels should coordinate planning, ecotourism policy-making, the compilation of guidebooks, and the conservation of vulnerable ecosystems, wild life, and cultural integrity.


2. Baseline studies of the natural environment of potential ecotourism areas should be carried out. These include Environmental Impact Assessments of ecotourism activities and research into carrying capacity to avoid overconcentration of tourists, too many hotels, and a level of noise and transportation that would seriously affect local life and natural environments.


3. Ecotourist guides should undergo compulsory training at colleges or universities. Staff, especially managers, should be equipped with professional skills and basic knowledge of ecotourist practices at home and abroad.


4. Local communities should be engaged in ecotourism—not only in generating greater income, but also in conservation work. This may require the development of special schemes.



Phan Nguyen Hong, Quan Thi Quynh Dao and Le Kim Thoa work at the Mangrove Ecosystem Research Division, Centre for Natural Resources and Environmental Studies, Vietnam National University, Hanoi. The case study presented in this paper is an initial finding from the project funded by the MAB/UNESCO within the Young MAB Scientist Award Programme 2002, and was undertaken with Le Kim Thoa. The author would like to express great gratitude to MAB/UNESCO for this support.


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from :Kyoto Review

Thailand

Thailand


Thank you very much, Acharn Giles. The title of my talk, “A Country is a Company, a PM is a CEO,” is based on a statement Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra made in November 1977 when he declared: “A company is a country. A country is a company. They’re the same. The management is the same.”


Thaksin’s election victory in January 2001 should be seen not just as the “rise of Thaksin,” but as the triumph of big business in Thai politics. Thaksin is not the only big businessman in or well connected to the Cabinet. Ukrist Pathmanand, others, and I elsewhere have described the circles of interest around this government, so I don’t need to go into detail. It’s enough to note that the Cabinet and the core of the Thai Rak Thai Party contain a significant selection of the big business families which managed to survive the crisis in reasonable shape.


Big business has captured the state. That in itself is interesting, and I will talk a little about how this came about. But what big business wants to do with the state is more interesting, and I’ll spend rather more time on that.


First, then, how did this capture of the state come about? To begin with, we have to understand that this is not totally new. In the era of military dictatorship, big business was very well connected politically. As parliamentary democracy developed, several big businessmen played a prominent role in the early stages, and later moved more into the background.


For most of the past two decades, they have not seen much need to take a direct political role. I think this was for two reasons. First, before 1997 globalization seemed to be a great thing. Big business profited more than any other social or economic segment by getting access to technology, ideas, education, markets, finance. Big business did not need the state to manage globalization. Second, the state did a pretty good job of looking after business’s interests inside the country without the need for direct management. It built infrastructure, controlled labor, kept the macro economy stable, and did not interfere much with big business itself.


All that changed over the 1990s, and especially in the 1997 crisis, in three main ways. First, the existing political system showed itself catastrophically incapable of protecting big business interests – in fact the government sleepwalked into a crisis which wrecked many of the largest companies. Second, globalization ceased to be a friend but became a threat – in the shape of the IMF and predatory transnational capital. And third, society became more demanding. The 1990s was a decade of protest, new political organizations, and arguments for structural change. (I will come back to this issue below).


These three changes provided the motivation for big business to take a larger political role. Two other things made this much easier. First, parts of the 1997 constitution had an urban, centrist bias which provided the openings for big business. Second, the widespread social havoc of the crisis created an equally widespread demand for political change which could be exploited by electoral promises and party imagery.


Now let me move to the second part, how big business wants to use the state. I divide this into two areas, which are broadly economic and sociopolitical respectively.


First, economic. This government wants to shift towards a form of the “developmentalist” state found in other parts of Asia over the past generation. By “developmentalist” I mean that the state takes a more active part in protecting and promoting domestic capital in order to achieve catch-up economic growth.


This is not a new ambition on the part of Thai domestic capital. Back in 1980, the banker and finance minister Boonchu Rojanasatian campaigned for “Thailand Inc.” and said: “We should run the country like a business firm.” That effort was blocked by the generals, who worried that capitalism rampant would stimulate communism rampant too.


Thaksin has echoed Boonchu almost exactly, talking of “Thailand Company Limited” and saying, “A country is a company. A company is a country. They’re the same.”

Economic growth is the Thaksin government’s primary focus. At first, it was simply recovery from the crisis. Once this was on the way, the goal became attaining OECD status and transiting into the first world. This is the primary goal that shapes all of the secondary ones.


For earlier developmentalist states (Japan, Korea, Taiwan), the aim was to force-feed domestic capitalism through three main kinds of policies: directed credit; industrial policy, meaning packages of protective and promotional measures for selected sectors or firms; and control of labor.


Thailand’s new developmentalism differs in some important ways because of the change in era and the special character of Thailand’s economy. Most importantly, Thailand has pursued trade liberalization and later financial liberalization for many years, so the economy is highly open and externally oriented. Changing this orientation would be highly costly. Since the boom and bust, most major industry – and especially export industry – is under transnational firms. The Thaksin government’s policy is not to withdraw from this transnational dominance. It accepts that this is the age of transnational production networks. Rather the government tries to promote Thailand as a site for export location, tourism, and investment, and at the same time to upgrade Thailand’s position within transnational production chains.


In parallel, the government wants to promote and protect domestic capital in sectors oriented to domestic consumption, especially service industries. These sectors are somewhat protected from foreign competition, not by trade protection but by other legal barriers, such as the ban on foreign ownership of land and restrictions on foreign investment in media, telecommunications, and certain kinds of services on the grounds of special or security reasons. These sectors are also the ones in which most of the family businesses connected to the government are involved.


The government has moved towards what used to be called “industrial policy,” though here it is formulated in terms of business school economics and labeled “enhancing competitiveness” and promotion of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Five strategic industries have been openly identified for promotion, including: fashion; agriprocessing; automobiles; ICT, especially graphics; and services, including tourism, restaurants, medicine, and logistics. Others are clearly being promoted in parallel through cronyist ties. Note that the majority of strategic industries are in services or service-related.


The government is also involved in channeling credit on a scale never previously seen in Thailand. The 1997 crisis pole-axed the commercial banks and finance companies. Those that survived are still reluctant to lend. At the same time, the crisis transferred many banking assets to government control. The government’s Krung Thai Bank was transformed from a sleepy dinosaur into the country’s largest lender. In addition, the government has mobilized other semi-dormant state banks and state specialized financial institutions (e.g., Government Saving Bank, EXIM Bank, SME Bank), expanded their roles, and urged them to lend. It has also experimented with ways to steal dormant deposits away from the remaining commercial banks; launched schemes of subsidized credit (for real estate and SMEs); begun using the stock market to corporatize and refinance state enterprises; and set up a state Asset Management Corporation which is able to restore the creditworthiness of formally bankrupt companies. The government has become the major factor in the allocation of credit.


The government is also stimulating consumption in order to create the market for domestically-oriented enterprise. This began with Keynesian stimulus under the previous government. Thaksin expanded this by encouraging a large increase in consumer debt.


Finally, the Thaksin government is intent on broadening and deepening the extent of the domestic capitalist economy. The thinking is simple: many people still live in a semi-subsistence economy. Incorporating them more firmly into capitalism will increase growth (as well as reduce poverty). The Thaksin government’s so-called “populist” schemes are easily misunderstood as similar to Latin American welfare populism. With the exception of the cheap health scheme, this is not the case. The Thaksin schemes are mostly about stimulating entrepreneurship by increasing the access to capital. Thaksin has said: “Capitalism needs capital, without which there is no capitalism. We need to push capital into the rural areas.” Thaksin’s adviser, Pansak Vinyaratn, claimed: “For the first time in the history of Thailand, we have moved capital closer to the people.” The same logic is being applied to some parts of the illegal or underground economy. The government wants to legalize them and bring them within the scope of the legitimate economy.


Now let me come to the socio-political part. Here my argument in summary is as follows. While big business has seized the state to manage external threats, it has also seized it to manage internal threats. This second mission is just as important, and much less understood.


After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Thailand’s military rule, there was a big expansion of political space – protests, civil society, NGOs, public intellectuals, people politics, new organizations, etc. More people were looking for new ways to challenge the distribution of power and wealth. This upsurge threatens the interests of big business in many ways. Most directly, it threatens its ability to command the use of natural resources for land development, power generation, waste disposal, and many other things. By the end of the 1990s, almost every large-scale project was challenged and blocked by protest.


More subtly, this new civil society embraced ideologies which aim to severely reduce the power of the central state. These ideologies arose in reaction to the centralized, top-down, dictatorial state of the era of military rule, which was willed almost intact to the new parliamentary politicians. These protest ideologies range from classic liberalism, which simply wants to qualify state power through greater transparency, rule of law, checks and balances, etc., through to more anarchistic ideas such as the community culture movement, which wants to disassemble the central state and return power to local communities. These liberal and anarchistic strains were logically opposed to one another, but in many of the campaigns of the 1990s they could cooperate in opposition to the central leviathan. Moreover, these agendas started to have real influence within the state. Some of the key policy documents of the late 1990s were written from this perspective, namely, many parts of the 1997 constitution, the eighth development plan, the decentralization law, education reform proposals, and so on.


Just when big business wanted to seize the state and use it to force-feed capitalism, civil society movements wanted to disassemble or restructure the state to be more responsive to other interests. And these agendas began to have influence over the state.


Moreover, the protest movements disrupting the big projects were intertwined with the ideological campaigns against the strong state. The ideologues rode on the backs of the protesters to press their agenda; the protesters contracted the ideologues to articulate their demands in a wider political context. Moreover, this axis began to benefit from globalization, whose benefits had earlier seemed to fall mostly to big business and the middle class. Similar protest movements and ideological currents began to link together on a transnational scale, leading to such events as the World Social Forum and the siege of Seattle.


Since 2001, the Thaksin government has closed down much of the political space opened up over the prior quarter-century. This has been dramatic. The government has pursued five main approaches.


First, the government has tried in part to quell protest through a new “social contract” offering some more welfare, village funds, and various “care” schemes. Second, where this approach is ineffective, the government reverts to repression. The Pak Mun dam issue nicely fits this pattern. Thaksin himself went directly to the protesters and offered them money. When they refused, he settled the issue summarily without even completing the government-financed research and had the protest camps forcibly dismantled. To aid in countering protests, the government has added several repressive laws and has partially rehabilitated the military to serve as an ally and resource. It has aggressively targeted the NGO movement.


Third, the government has tamed the media through a mixture of law, regulation, intimidation, and money. The media is possibly tamer now than at any time in Thailand’s modern history, except the immediate aftermath of the 1976 massacre.


Fourth, the government has launched campaigns of social discipline. Some of these are peripheral – little more than state aid for panicked middle-class parents who cannot control their children and particularly their children’s sex lives. But behind these campaigns is an idea of the state’s duty and ability to discipline what Habermas would call the life-world. This is summed up in the phrase “social order,” which in its Thai version, rabiap sangkhom, has a much greater tone of conformity and orderliness than the English. For example, the Ministry of Culture has been running a TV ad for several months about a bad youth who would not bend his back in the traditional stoop of deference. The “final war on drugs” in 2003 had many objectives, but one of its outcomes was to intimidate all forms of social deviance.


Fifth, the government is promoting nationalism. This is not the political nationalism of the colonial and cold-war eras, but an economic nationalism. The thinking is explained in Liah Greenfeld’s book, The Spirit of Capitalism, which Thaksin and his advisors have publicly quoted on several occasions. The main message of the book is that societies which put priority on achieving economic growth to make their nation great can achieve growth very rapidly. Greenfeld wrote: “Where nationalism embraces economic competitiveness, the ‘take-off into sustained growth’ can be expected to take place within a generation…. Nationalism was like the magic wand that changed Cinderella’s pumpkin and mice into a gilded coach-and-four.” Greenfeld’s second message is that societies which start on this path but get distracted by other goals such as democracy or rights or the quality of life or equity are likely to fall by the wayside.


At the end of last year, Thaksin said: “Democracy is a good and beautiful thing, but it’s not the ultimate goal as far as administering the country is concerned…. Democracy is just a tool, not our goal. The goal is to give people a good lifestyle, happiness, and national progress.”


In sum, I see Thaksin as the leader of a big business project to seize the state in order to protect big business against both external and internal threats, and in order to achieve a “great leap forward” into advanced capitalism. Thaksin and his allies want to manage the economy more actively by using state tools to mobilize resources and deepen capitalism. They want to manage the society to suppress alternative agendas which might obstruct this great leap forward, particularly agendas which prioritize rights, democracy, or equity above growth. Thailand is obviously adopting a form of developmentalism along the line of the Asian NICs in the 1970s, but with differences because of the way the world has changed over recent decades.


When a country becomes a company, and government becomes management, then people are not so much citizens with rights, liberties, and aspirations, but rather consumers and factors of production. Thank you.


Giles Ji Ungpakorn: Thank you very much, Prof. Pasuk. Our next speaker is Associate Professor Paul Hutchcroft, who is currently based in the University of Wisconsin in the United States, where he specializes on comparative politics on Southeast Asia, especially the Philippines.


from :Kyoto Review

The Pondok and the Madrasah in Patani

Hasan Madmarn
Bangi / Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press / 1999



by Naimah Talib
The study of traditional Islamic institutions in Southern Thailand has not received much systematic and scholarly attention. Institutions such as the pondok (private Islamic boarding schools) are historically important to the Malay-Muslim community in Thailand. They perform a key role in providing religious instruction and also in deepening the community’s understanding of Islam. Moreover, they are closely associated with Malay-Muslim identity and often act as a pivot for Malay social life. Hasan Madmarn’s study of the pondok and madrasah in Patani is a valuable contribution to the literature on traditional Islamic institutions. In particular, he offers fascinating insight into the workings of the traditional pondok and its influential role in Patani society.


From about 1782, the Siamese monarchy began gradually to extend its influence over the Kingdom of Patani. Patani was then divided into seven administrative areas, each under the control of a Siamese-appointed chief. In the 1890s, King Chulalongkorn’s reforms creating a centralized administration undermined the power and influence of the Muslim rulers further, leading by the early twentieth century to direct control by the Siamese authority. However, Siamese officials spoke little if any Malay and governed from the towns, while the Malays generally stayed in the countryside and found security and sanctuary in their religion and culture. Today, Malay-Muslims form the majority in the four southern Thai provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, Satun, and Yala, but make up a small minority in the country as a whole.


In the 1930s and 1940s, attempts by the Phibun government to assimilate ethnic minorities into national life had a direct impact on the Muslim community in the South. Malay-Muslims protested at the assimilation measures and there emerged growing dissatisfaction, especially among the young. This resulted in a determined attempt to revive Malay identity and raise the level of Islamic consciousness. Religious institutions such as the pondok were used to disseminate ideas of Pan-Malay nationalism and Islamic revivalism.


Hasan Madmarn’s monograph highlights some of these issues. He draws attention to the historical importance of Greater Patani as a center of Islamic learning and to the various responses of the pondok to government policies intended to modernize them. He also discusses the adjustments made by providers of religious education in Pattani province in the last few decades.


Hasan begins his study with the role of Patani as an independent Malay-Muslim kingdom in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Patani religious scholars, the ulama, offered Islamic classical education to keen students through the pondok, providing both basic and advanced courses in Malay and Arabic. Hasan gives a detailed and excellent evaluation of Patani’s religious scholars in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, highlighting their contribution to the writing of important religious commentaries and to translation from Arabic into Malay, written in the Jawi script. Many of the ulama, such as Shaykh Dawud al-Fatani and Shaykh Ahmad al-Fatani, distinguished themselves in the religious centers of the Middle East in the nineteenth century and were connected to networks of religious scholars within the Malay and wider Muslim world. The Holy Mosque at Mecca (Masjid al-Haram) became a much sought-after destination for graduates of the Patani pondok. Hasan also stresses the importance of the Malay language in religious instruction, maintaining that much of the literature used for religious instruction was in Malay, the students’ own language.


In his study of the pondok, Hasan examines the role of Chana, a town in Songkhla province, from the 1930s to the 1950s. Chana had four major and highly regarded pondok whose reputation enabled them to attract students from all over Thailand and British Malaya. The ulama of these pondok belonged to the Kaum Tua, or traditional school, which favored “all that was traditional, unchanging and secure” (p.18). The traditional pondok system of learning is narrowly based and “medieval” at best (p.21). There is no system of assessment and students learn by rote and by taking down commentaries and explanations given by their religious teachers. As in other parts of the peninsula, the Kaum Tua came into conflict with the proponents of modernist reform, called the Kaum Muda. Hasan mentions Tok Guru Ghani, a leading member of the Kaum Muda group, who introduced the modern madrasah into the traditional system of religious instruction represented by the pondok.


In contrast to the pondok’s exclusive focus on religion, the madrasah curriculum is broadly based, emphasizes knowledge application, and has a relatively vigorous system of assessment. The madrasah is often modeled on similar schools found in the Middle East. Here it would have been useful for Hasan to discuss the relative popularity of madrasah and pondok schools before the 1960s, but he does not provide information on enrolment for these two types of institutions. More attention is given to the ulama of Patani, the mainstay of the pondok system, than to the proponents of the madrasah system.


Neither does he cover in much detail the impact of Thai government policies to upgrade and introduce secular subjects into the pondok schools in the early 1960s. This program entailed the registration of all pondok with the Ministry of Education and was aimed at transforming them into private schools subject to government regulation. This inevitably resulted in a new conception of the pondok as an educational rather than a religious institution. By 1971, 400 pondok had been registered and have survived as “private schools.” Hasan mentions the concern of religious teachers when Islam came “under government control” (p.74), but offers little evidence of resistance against the registration policy that made it compulsory for the pondok to use Thai as one of the languages of instruction.


The fears of religious teachers were confirmed by the 1987 policy extending compulsory education from six to nine years. Religious teachers at this time publicly opposed the policy because it would limit the time Muslim children could spend in religious schools. Another response to government reform was the attempt to transform pondok into madrasah. This would allow religious teachers to modernize their curriculum and include the objectives of the Thai educational system while preserving the tradition of Islamic learning associated with the pondok.


The Thai government, meanwhile, provided incentives to Muslim children to remain in public education by encouraging the teaching of Islam in elementary schools, a move that was received positively. (There was also an attempt to upgrade the standard of teaching and the curriculum of Islamic private schools, the post-registration pondok schools.) In time, Islamic subjects were introduced at the secondary level of public schools, and eventually, the Education Ministry established the College of Islamic Studies at the Prince of Songkhla University. This allowed students to pursue Islamic studies in Thailand at the tertiary level for the first time.


While Hasan has done a commendable study on the institution of the pondok, giving adequate attention to the curriculum and the learning process, and highlighting the contributions of religious scholars, he has not addressed the role of religious institutions within the broader context of political change in the Southern provinces. For example, there is no discussion of allegations that the separatist movement in Southern Thailand has used pondok as recruitment centers. Without exaggerating the importance of separatist demands, it may be worthwhile to underline the terms by which the Muslim community has tried to negotiate its integration into mainstream Thai political and social life. Education continues to serve as an important key to integration and development, as most pondok have been transformed into private Islamic schools under the government’s jurisdiction.


The competition for students between traditional, private Islamic schools and government-run public secular schools that include Islamic subject matter is also a pertinent issue not carefully examined here. At question is whether the pondok can adapt to conform to the Thai national educational curriculum and continue to exist alongside secular schools. Certainly, the pondok is under increasing pressure to redefine its role in Thai Muslim society.


Naimah Talib teaches at University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand.

from :Kyoto Review

Overseas Filipino Workers, Labor Circulation in Southeast Asia, and the (Mis)management of Overseas Migration Programs

Odine de Guzman


In recent years overseas contract work has become the Philippines’ prime export commodity. In the year following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, overseas Filipino worker (OFW) remittances amounted to US$7 billion. (DER-BSP, Table 11. OFW Remittances By Country and By Type of Worker.) OFW remittance is such a vital source of revenue that since the mid-1980s the government has lauded these workers as the country’s “new economic heroes” or mga bagong bayani. This essay highlights the growth of women’s participation in the ongoing Filipino labor diaspora and underscores the government’s active promotion of overseas labor migration. It discusses Filipino international migration within the context of labor circulation in Southeast Asia, comparing the experience of overseas domestic work of Filipinos and Indonesians. Finally, this essay examines two forms of involvement by the international community in current women’s migration issues – the promotion of international protections and research on different aspects of women’s migration – and includes a current reference list on the issue.


The bagong bayani are a diverse group. They include emigrants and contract workers, both of whom may be documented or undocumented. (NGO statistics categorize these two groups as overseas Filipinos and overseas Filipino workers.) As of 2001, overseas Filipinos numbered 2.74 million and OFWs 4.67 million, of whom 3.05 million are documented and 1.62 million undocumented (Kanlungan Center, citing the Commission on Filipinos Overseas, Department of Foreign Affairs). OFWs are further statistically classified as sea-based workers, who are largely male, and land-based workers, who are the focus of this essay.


Initially, the workers were called OCWs, or overseas contract workers, a term which is descriptive of a temporary and contractual employment status – usually fixed terms of six months to two years. Moreover, the term bespeaks the workers’ lack of physical and social mobility in the receiving country, which is restricted by the terms of their contract. Because of the growing prominence of overseas work and of the sense of being neither here nor there implied by “OCW,” the term has fallen out of favor in both government and media parlance. “OFW” – with the insertion of “Filipino” adding a national projection as befits new heroes – has become the preferred version.


Being heroes, however, does not mean the government can guarantee OFW welfare, despite remittances that annually amount to billions of dollars. News reports abound of victims of abuse and of the death of overseas contract workers since the early 1990s.[1] These include Singapore’s much talked-about 1995 execution of Flor Contemplacion, who was convicted of killing a Filipina domestic worker and her Singaporean ward; the unresolved case of Mary Jane Ramos;[2] the case of Sarah Jane Dematera, on death row for 11 years (Kanlungan Center); and numerous others that remain unreported.


The Feminization of Philippine Overseas Labor Migration

These news reports sketch the current face of Philippine overseas labor migration. It is increasingly female and services-oriented. In 1992, of the total deployed, land-based, newly hired OFWs, 50 percent were female. This increased to 58 percent in 1995, 64 percent in 1999, and 72 percent in 2001.


The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) lists eight skill categories. In the period 1992 to 2001, the skill category “service workers” comprised an average 35 percent of the total number of deployed newly hired, land-based workers (POEA InfoCenter; NSCB). In that ten-year period, “service workers” was consistently one of the top two in terms of newly hired workers deployed. It alternated with the category “production workers,” which was the top occupation of overseas land-based migrants in the 1970s and which was the top occupation of deployed workers in the years 1994, 1996, and 1998-2000. The third highest category in the same period was “professional and technical workers,” which overtook “production workers” in 2001 (POEA InfoCenter).


The stereotypical gender division of labor is replicated in these skill categories. Production workers are predominantly male at 71 percent of the newly deployed in 2002, while service workers and professional and technical workers, largely nurses and overseas performing artists, are mostly female. (Dancers and musicians made up 72 percent of this skill category in 2000; 99.5 percent of all deployed entertainers went to Japan [POEA Annual Report 2000]. In 2002, 85 percent of deployed newly hired “professional and technical workers” were female.)


Fifty-two percent of the women deployed in 1992 were service workers; 59 percent in 1995; and 47 percent in 2000 (POEA 2002). From 1992 to 2001, women comprised an average 89 percent of deployed newly hired service workers. They comprised 92 percent of deployed newly hired service workers in 2000, 91 percent in 2001, and 90 percent in 2002.


The feminization of Philippine overseas labor migration, which had been male-dominated until the 1980s, belies the failure of women’s empowerment in society. The increasing out-migration of women indicates a decline, or continuing limitation, in the share of work available to women in the production process; employment opportunities remain restricted and income insufficient. The majority of female OFWs are still in “traditional” reproductive work such as domestic work and cultural entertainment, health care and nursing, where the pay is low and the nature of the work involves a higher exposure to physical, sexual and other abuse. This in turn underscores the international division of labor, in which the Third World, or the South, does the labor-intensive and lower-paid work. It also demonstrates a persistent gendered division of labor at the global level, with the South taking on the menial aspects of reproductive work, which are thereby “feminized,” secondary, subservient, and inferior to the “masculine,” dominant North.


The State and Overseas Labor Migration[3]


Migration is not wholly a personal decision motivated by desire for capitalist accumulation, but also reflects the lack of development policies on the part of the government and the lack of satisfactory living and employment opportunities within the home country. Feminist activist Wilhelmina S. Orozco asserted , as early as 1985, that the government had deliberately promoted labor migration as a solution to unemployment and growing national accounts deficits. Subsequently, sociologists Graziano Battistella and Anthony Paganoni (1992, 1996), Maruja M.B. Asis (1992), Joaquin Gonzalez III (1996, 1998), and urban planner Benjamin Cariño (1995) have examined the policies and directives of government administrations since Marcos, demonstrating how the government actively promotes labor migration with provision for the welfare of the migrants often an afterthought.


The administration of Ferdinand E. Marcos was blatant in its desire to use labor migration as a solution to the nation’s economic problems. The government was assertive in promoting and maintaining its warm body export. The Labor Code of 1974 formalized the Philippine labor migration program and had as its main goal the promotion of overseas contract work in order for government to reap the economic benefits of lower unemployment and workers’ remittances. In 1982, the Central Bank, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Labor and Employment made the remittance of 50 to 70 percent of workers’ salaries mandatory through Executive Order 857. Sanctions such as the non-renewal of passports or disapproval of new contracts were imposed on those who did not comply. Executive Order 857 was so unpopular with contract workers that government abandoned it for more relaxed measures, like incentives to remitting migrants, the Suwerte sa Bangko program, the Balikbayan program, and the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) remittance assistance program (Gonzalez III, 1996).


Government policies and regulations on labor migration up to this period were but slight refinements of the Commonwealth government’s laws from 1915 to 1933, all of which focused on the economic benefits the United States government could gain from this enterprise. The Labor Code of 1974 only made the provisions in the previous laws more organized and economically viable.


In the late 1980s, the abuse of women migrant workers started to be widely publicized. Following a temporary moratorium on the deployment of Filipino entertainers to Japan, the administration of Corazon C. Aquino temporarily banned the deployment of domestic workers on January 20, 1988. The ban was meant to protect Filipino women migrants from being abused and exploited in the foreign countries where they worked.[4] But as NGO activists contended, no matter how well intentioned, the ban was wrong policy: because of it, many more women would leave the country illegally and would “no longer be entitled to government protection, thus putting [them] completely at the mercy of [their] employers” (Ocampo 1988, 5). Another issue was the ban’s infringement of the constitutional rights of workers to travel and find gainful employment. It was meant as leverage for negotiating better terms and conditions for the workers, but as migrant activists also pointed out, it was not binding on receiving states, who could simply turn to other developing countries for cheap labor.


NGOs proposed more concrete measures to address the abuse of overseas workers. They demended that government “put more teeth in the country’s labor laws to guarantee [the] protection of overseas domestic [workers],” compel labor attaches to do their jobs, and “enforce government-to-government negotiations for a fair deal for Filipino domestic [workers]” (C.D. Nagot, Gabriela spokesperson, quoted in Delos Santos 1988, 1; M.L. Alcid 1988; I.L. Laguindam 1988). In a press statement, Filipina domestic helpers in Hong Kong proposed the following (The United Filipinos Against the Ban, 1988):


Forge bilateral agreements with receiving countries. Proposals for HK:
(A) Repeal of the new conditions of stay for foreign domestic helpers.
(B) Strict implementation and monitoring of the employment agency regulations. Exorbitant fees and replacement guarantees to employers must be stopped.
(C) Meting out of appropriate penalties against abusive employers and agencies, from blacklisting to imprisonment.
(D) Standardization of working hours to a maximun of 12 hours of daily work.

Provide on-site protection to overseas Filipinos. Use the Welfare Fund to provide legal assistance, counseling, emergency loans, educational activities.

Educate certain officials and staff of Philippine Consulates on the rights and welfare of migrants. Remove anti-migrant officials.

Reorient overseas employment programs and agencies concerned to cater to interests and protection of rights of workers.

Abide by ILO instruments pertinent to migration and migrant workers, esp. Convention nos. 97 and 143, Recommendation nos. 86, 100, 151, 169.

Institutionalize the representation of overseas Filipinos in national and local (receiving countries) policy-making bodies.

Uphold people’s right to gainful employment. Develop viable local employment programs as an alternative to cheap labor export.

Subsequently, the Aquino administration lifted the ban for selected countries, Middle Eastern countries being the last. Maruja M.B. Asis (1992) noted that although the issue of remittances was important to the government, a gradual shift toward welfare and protection was noticeable among the executive orders and legislation passed during Aquino’s term. Among the most publicized of Aquino’s presidential actions was Proclamation No. 276, signed on June 21, 1988, which declared December “The Month of Overseas Filipinos.” In recognition of their contribution to the national economy, President Aquino called overseas contract workers the new heroes of the country or the new economic heroes. (Another version is “modern-day heroes,” which gained currency in the latter part of the 1990s, which Hong Kong activists counter with “modern-day slaves.”)


The epithet could not protect the migrant workers from being abused overseas. After a couple of highly publicized deaths of Filipina domestic workers abroad, the succeeding administration of Fidel V. Ramos tried to put a hold on the “new hero” syndrome. In 1996, RA 8042, the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, was implemented to show government support for the new Philippine heroes following national outrage at the execution of Flor Contemplacion. At the same time, government publicists floated the idea that Filipinos need not go abroad to get good employment.


Ramos promised economic prosperity through his Philippines 2000 program, which aimed to achieve NIC-hood (newly industrialized country status) by the year 2000. Nevertheless, remittances from overseas Filipino workers were still one of the bigger sources of government revenue.


At the end of 2000, Joseph Estrada, the thirteenth President of the Republic, called upon OFWs to be patient and continue supporting his beleaguered administration. Estrada said “the OFWs should continually remit their hard-earned dollars here to help prop up the heavily battered economy and to help in praying for his critics and political opponents” (Manila Bulletin, December 10, 2000). Later, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in her state visit to Singapore in 2001, was quoted as saying: “The Philippine economy will be, for the foreseeable future, heavily dependent still on overseas workers’ remittances” (Agence France Presse, 2001). In a keynote speech to welcoming Filipinos in Kuala Lumpur during her state visit to Malaysia in the same month, the President proffered a new name for the economic heroes: OFI, or overseas Filipino investors. In this telling, overseas Filipino workers “invested” their talents and energy in the receiving country.[5]


One aggressive “investment” strategy the government reportedly adopted was to deploy “at least one million people” abroad annually, or 2740 persons per day (Kanlungan Center 2001). The NGO further quotes the President as saying: “Jobs here are difficult to find and we are depending on people outside the country. If you can find work there and send money to your relatives here, then perhaps you should stay there” (Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 28, 2001). In keeping with the spirit of the free market espoused by Macapagal-Arroyo, the implementation period of the controversial sections of RA 8042, which provide for the deregulation of overseas employment and the gradual phase-out of the POEA, fell during this administration.


Part VII of RA 8042 reads:


SEC. 29. COMPREHENSIVE DEREGULATION PLAN ON RECRUITMENT ACTIVITIES.
Pursuant to a progressive policy of deregulation whereby the migration of workers becomes strictly a matter between the worker and his foreign employer, the DOLE within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, is hereby mandated to formulate a five-year comprehensive deregulation plan on recruitment activities taking into account labor market trends, economic conditions of the country and emergency circumstances which may affect the welfare of migrant workers.

SEC. 30. GRADUAL PHASE-OUT OF REGULATORY FUNCTIONS.
Within a period of five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the DOLE shall phase out the regulatory functions of the POEA pursuant to the objectives of deregulation.

Like her predecessors, Macapagal-Arroyo could only enjoin OFWs to “stay put abroad and continue to send their dollar remittances until the Philippine economy stabilizes” (Del Callar, 2001). Yet at the same, the government officially maintained that overseas employment was not a policy: “In an August 2001 meeting with a delegation of overseas Filipinos advocating for their right to vote, Labor Secretary Patricia Santo Tomas objected to any reference to ‘export of labor,’ saying that people go abroad on their own volition” (Kanlungan Center 2001; underscoring mine).


The new heroes of the country, ang mga bagong bayani, continue to hold a special place in government rhetoric.


Migration in the Region

Filipinos are not the only border-crossing labor migrants in contemporary Southeast Asia, though they are probably the most “encouraged” by their government and have the most organized way of dealing with the move (Azizah Kassim 1998; Jones 2000). One major receiving country is Malaysia, with about 743,641 legal foreign workers from ten countries, including the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia, and an estimated one million undocumented foreign workers. Alien labor accounted for about 20 percent of Malaysia’s workforce of about 8 million and about 10 percent of its population of about 20 million in 1995 (Azizah Kassim 1998). Sidney Jones asserts that “Malaysia was the largest employer of foreign labor in Asia in 1999” (Jones 2000, 3). But Malaysia also sends labor to neighboring countries such as Singapore – where 200,000 Malaysians reportedly work (Jones 2000), some of them illegally – Brunei, Taiwan, and Japan. Azizah Kassim (1998) explains that Malaysian workers in these countries are found in domestic services, manufacturing, construction, and services, the sectors occupied by foreign migrant workers in Malaysia. That is, semi-skilled Malaysian workers take up jobs abroad that they refuse in their home country because of relatively higher pay, while some professionals opt to stay in Brunei for the tax breaks the Sultanate offers.


Thailand also sends workers abroad, while receiving a number of illegal workers, in this case from Myanmar and Southern China. They too work in the sectors occupied by Thais in foreign countries (Azizah Kassim 1998); because of their irregular status wages are often determined by what employers can afford and sometimes by the generosity of employers. Estimates of migrants in 1998 put the number at one million, with two-thirds likely to be irregular (Jones 2000).


Thailand has exported labor to countries in the Middle East (mostly Saudi Arabia), Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, and the United States since the 1980s. Political instability in the Middle East, however, shifted Thai labor movement toward Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. By the 1990s, Thai overseas labor was predominantly located in the Asia-Pacific region. In 1993, 85 percent of total overseas Thai labor was in the region, with 32 percent based in Singapore, Brunei, and Malaysia. The major destinations of 191,735 deployed Thai labor migrants in 1998 were Taiwan, Singapore, Brunei, Japan, Israel, Malaysia, and Hong Kong (Battistella 2000, 13).


As of 2000, Singapore was home to approximately 530,000 foreign workers. Officially, the workers could be recruited from Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao, South Korea, Thailand, India, Bangladesh, and the Philippines. The largest group of foreign workers in the country was Malaysian, while the second largest was Filipino; there were also reports of the presence of a considerable number of Indonesians and mainland Chinese. Foreign workers occupied the following sectors: domestic services, which registered approximately 100,000 workers; construction (200,000); shipyards; services; and hotels. Of the 530,000, around 80,000 were highly skilled and worked in finance, business, commerce, and manufacturing (Battistella 2000, 12).


Brunei had been importing labor since the mid-1980s; the foreign workers based in Brunei were from Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines as well as from India and Bangladesh. In 1988, the largest foreign worker group was Malaysian with 18,418 workers, followed by Thai at 9,941 workers (Azizah Kassim 1998). Currently, Brunei’s private citizens are “dependent on migrant workers for 74% of [their] manpower” [needs] (Jayasankaran 2003).


Like its Philippine counterpart, the Indonesian government under the New Order started “sending migrant workers overseas as one of strategic ways to overcome unemployment and to increase foreign exchange” (Eko Susi Rosdianasari 2000, 93). From the late 1960s to the early 1990s, Indonesia processed over 700,000 overseas workers’ papers, the majority of which (like Thais and Filipinos in the 1970s and 80s) were for the Middle East. Twenty-four percent went to Malaysia and Singapore; however, this number did not include the over half a million believed to be in Malaysia undocumented (Azizah Kassim 1998). By in 1997, as noted by Graeme Hugo, the Malaysian Immigration Department was impelled to raise estimates of Indonesian workers residing in the country to 1.9 million after nearly 1.4 million resident Indonesians voted in the 1997 Indonesian elections. (The year before, about 300,000 undocumented workers had been legalized.) This estimate was far greater than most others – for example, those based on a 1993 amnesty in Peninsular Malaysia when half a million Indonesians came forward (Hugo 2002). Overall figures as of 1999 indicated an estimated three million workers without “any formal document” – most from East and Central Java, East and West Nusa Tenggara, and South Sulawesi – while statistics from 1994 to 1999 showed 1,461,236 labor migrants leaving Indonesia each year.


A projected 36 million Indonesians were expected to be affected by underemployment toward the end of 2000 when a 2 percent (per annum) economic growth rate was expected.[6] Eko Susi Rosdianasari (2000) asserted that the Workers Department therefore aimed to deploy 2.8 million workers between 1999 and 2004, even as laws and government policies continued to lack measures to protect migrant workers. The government expected a return of up to US$12 billion in remittances from this enterprise.[7]


Indonesians’ top countries of destination are Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, followed by Singapore, Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong, Brunei, and Korea. Indonesian labor migrants are mostly found in domestic work and in factories, industries, hotels, hospitals, and plantations, while a hefty 70 percent of all overseas Indonesian migrant workers are women.


Filipino and Indonesian Women in Foreign Households

While the majority of Filipino and Indonesian women labor migrants end up in domestic work, it is considered to be risky and sending governments do not have strong bilateral agreements with receiving states on the protection of these women. As noted earlier, numerous Filipino women have met misfortune in varying degrees in their quest for economic upliftment as overseas domestic workers. Media reports in Indonesia have likewise exposed the abuses experienced by women migrant workers, many of whom are domestic workers. The abuse begins in the home country, at the hands of a tekong (middleman/illegal recruiter) and calo (small company or individual recruiter), and continues in the employer’s home in the form of non-payment of wages, long working hours, subjection to cultural taboos, or physical and sexual abuse. The protection of domestic workers is made difficult because of the location of the work in the employer’s private residence, where the lines between the employee’s work and private time/space are blurred.


It is made even more difficult in Indonesia when “maids are not [considered] workers” and “continue to be regarded as the private property of households” (Ati Nurbati 2000, 91, 90). Because of the general assumption that domestic workers have low education and that “they sleep and eat for free,” their salaries are low and are not governed by minimum wage laws. In fact, “[a]s ‘part of the family,’ a maid’s wage is not public business” (ibid., 91). The notion that a domestic worker’s welfare, including salary, lies beyond the scope of public business partly originates from the capitalist division of labor into the productive and reproductive spheres, where the notion of work is a “production process that contributes to capitalist accumulation and exchange” (Eviota 1992, cited in Cheng 1996, 110). In contrast, domestic work falls within the “process of reproduction, essential to the survival of the family and society, [but] does not directly lead to the process of accumulation and exchange;” thus, it is not customarily considered work, thereby, it converts the status of domestic workers into non-workers (ibid). To a certain extent, women domestic workers fall within the ambit of the private on account of gender relations in society. Patriarchal societies deem women’s proper place to be the home, while men rightly belong in the public arena.


A review of most government policies and legislation on the protection of migrant workers shows that domestic workers’ specific labor problems are not factored in at all (Palma-Beltran and Javate-de Dios 1992; Heyzer 1994, also cited in Jones 2000; Goldberg 1996). Even so, many women leave because domestic workers at home earn only 15-20% of what they can earn abroad. In real terms, however, the enormous recruitment fees and other travel expenses increase their family’s living expenses, sometimes exponentially.


Indonesian domestic workers in Malaysia are offered between US$90 and US$150 per month with recruitment fees to be deducted from the first three months. But there are numerous reports of more deductions than agreed upon and failure to receive full or any salary at all (Jones 2000; Ati Nurbaiti 2000; Eko Susi Rosdianasari 2000). Yet for US$100 a month, many a rural woman would take the risk of illegal detention, torture, and even death, strengthened by the hope that one’s own fate will be different. (The bulk of reported abuse of Indonesian domestic workers is in Saudi Arabia, with many physically and sexually abused.)


Aside from the often-marginalized position of migrant workers in receiving countries, workers also fall into hierarchical categories within migrant groups, which can be imposed upon them by local society. In the hierarchy of overseas domestic workers in Malaysia, for example, Filipinos are on the top rung. Indonesians fall into a lower salary range because they usually have a lower level of education, are not yet knowledgeable about the use of “modern” household equipment, and are not proficient in the English language.


But regardless of foreign language proficiency, overseas domestic workers are almost always unjustly considered “potential prostitutes” by local officials and laypeople who tend to prejudge foreign workers (Jones 2000, 65); in fact, even in their home country, unmarried Indonesian women leaving to work as domestic workers are imagined as “social misfits who could not get husbands or who had personal problems at home that prompted them to leave” (64-65), despite the financial support they send back. Of course, recruited domestic workers every now and then unwittingly do end up in prostitution. The multi-million dollar business of trafficking in women thrives upon deceiving, or convincing, unsuspecting women and families about the rewards of overseas work. Once the migration process has started, where a worker actually ends up is determined by the recruiters and their allies. Sydney Jones asserts that in the case of Indonesian women, the high demand for overseas domestic workers in Malaysia facilitates the recruitment of women legal and illegal recruiters conscripting women for housework or for the brothel (65).


International Protections for Migrant Women

The incessant circulation of labor within the region attests to the interconnectedness of economies and unevenness of economic development among the neighboring countries, but it also intimates contiguous human relationships, harsh or otherwise. At the international level, the term “migrant” covers a broad spectrum of people on the move. It is commonly used to refer to people who journey to another country in search of work. The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines migrants “as those who migrate from one country to another for the purpose of being employed there,” which assumes that they are legally permitted to stay and work in the receiving country and implies that their movement is voluntary. However, migrants and migrant workers do not always migrate by choice. As the experience of many Asian women shows, a large number of migrant workers are forced by socio-economic circumstance or by recruiters or deceived into believing that they will be legally employed, but end up without legal status in receiving countries. The Beijing Platform for Action recognizes the following categories of migrant women: refugees, the internally displaced, migrant workers, immigrants, and victims of trafficking.


International Covenants seek to address the various injustices experienced by people in general. Typically, they are non-binding yet important in that states are encouraged, sometimes pressured, to act in accordance with international standards and the terms of the conventions. Among the United Nations documents that have significant language for the protection of migrant women are the following:


The Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, 1993, the first international document to “raise women’s rights as human rights and treat them as warranting equal recognition and treatment as those rights more traditionally defined” (Goldberg 1996, 176). The Vienna Declaration asserts women’s rights as “an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights.” Part I, par. 24 of the document recognizes migrant workers as “being among ‘those persons belonging to groups which have been rendered vulnerable’ and demands that ‘great importance must be given to the promotion and protection of [their] human rights’” (177).


The Copenhagen Declaration and Program of Action, 1995. Pamela Goldberg (1996) asserts that while the Copenhagen Declaration is replete with language addressing women’s issues, it does not particularly address the needs of migrant workers and has “nothing concerning migrant women specifically” (ibid). The document does refer throughout to “vulnerable and disadvantaged groups,” among which women migrants and women migrant workers have been “consistently identified in other documents,” which makes the phrase “vulnerable and disadvantaged groups” applicable to migrant women. The brief attention given to migrant workers “stresses the need for intensified international cooperation and national attention to the situation of migrant workers and their families (par. 63) and calls for the equitable treatment and integration of documented migrants, particularly, migrant workers and their families (par. 78)” (ibid).


The Cairo Declaration, which resulted from the International Conference on Population and Development in 1994, strongly promotes the protection of women and migrant women. Principle 12 states: “Countries should guarantee to all migrants basic human rights as included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”; chapter 10 deals entirely with the issue of international migration. Additionally, the document promotes issues of gender equality, equity, and empowerment of women, including the directive for states “to pay special attention to protection of the rights and safety of those who suffer from [degrading practices, such as trafficking in women, adolescents and children and exploitation through prostitution], crimes and those in potentially exploitable situations, such as migrant women… (par. 4.9).” Parts of chapter 10 attend to the particular issues of refugees and undocumented migrants, who were first distinguished from documented or regular migrants in the Copenhagen Declaration. The Cairo Declaration urges states to “cooperate in… safeguarding the basic human rights of undocumented migrants” (par. 10.17). Moreover, it advocates that governments


“adopt effective sanctions against those who organize undocumented migration, exploit undocumented migrants or engage in trafficking in undocumented migrants, especially those who engage in any form of international traffic in women, youth and children. Governments of countries in origin, where the activities of agents or other intermediaries in the migration process are legal, should regulate such activities in order to prevent abuses, especially exploitation, prostitution and coercive adoption (par. 10.18).”


The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, from the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in September 1995, is by far the most cognizant among UN conference documents of the issues of concern to women migrants (ibid). In addition to ensuring the rights of women and the girl child, the Beijing Declaration articulates a commitment to “address the structural causes of poverty through changes in economic structures, ensuring equal access for all women, including those in rural areas, as vital development agents, to productive resources, opportunities and public services” (par. 26). Goldberg cites the articles in the Declaration that commit to safeguarding the rights of women migrant workers thus:


“In its section on Violence Against Women (par. 112-130), the Platform for Action recognizes ‘[s]ome groups of women, such as… women migrants, including women migrant workers’ as being ‘particularly vulnerable to violence’ (par. 116). It calls for states to ‘[p]rovide women who are subjected to violence with access to the mechanism of justice, and, as provided for by the national legislation, to just and effective remedies for the harms they have suffered and inform women of their rights in seeking redress through such mechanisms’ (par. 124 (h)); and urges states to ‘[t]ake special measures to eliminate violence against women, particularly those in vulnerable situations… including enforcing any existing legislation and developing, as appropriate, new legislation for women migrant workers in both sending and receiving countries’ (par.126 (d)).”


Moreover, the Platform for Action recognizes the contributions of migrant workers, including domestic workers, as it strongly recommends the enactment or reformation of national policies to guarantee the protection of migrants’ human rights, including protection from abuse and exploitation by their guarantor (par. 148 (h); ibid).


The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, one of the few legally binding documents pertaining to international labor migration. The Convention required more than a decade of lobbying before it was ratified as an instrument of international law. Adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1990, it only came into force on July 1, 2003, with the ratification of the Convention by Guatemala, the twentieth ratifying state. The slow ratification of the Convention illustrated the rather ambiguous position of many states regarding the protection of migrants. Although governments acknowledged the need to protect migrants, binding themselves to such protection was a different matter. It was a combination of non-government organizations and civil society groups worldwide, along with the UN agencies, which tirelessly lobbied their governments to ratify the document. Nonetheless, the Convention demonstrates the international community’s recognition of and respect for the human rights of migrants and their families; more important, it declares the international community’s commitment to the comprehensive protection of the rights of these people in the economic, social, political, and cultural dimensions of relocation and reintegration.


Lori Brunio, chairperson of the Coalition for Migrants' Rights (CMR) in Hong Kong, has this to say about the ratification of the Convention: “For foreign domestic workers like us, having an international treaty like the MWC that clearly recognizes and protects our rights affirms our dignity and gives us more courage to fight against abuses, violence and discrimination. Even if the place where we work (Hong Kong) has not ratified, the MWC gives us indisputable basis for saying that we should be respected and treated fairly as human beings” (Asian Migrant Center 2003).


Other international documents that can be cited to ensure the protection of the human rights of women and migrant workers are: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (The People’s Movement for Human Rights Education 2003).


The International Labour Organization, which works “on the principle that all human beings irrespective of race, creed, or sex, have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom, dignity, economic security, and equal opportunity,” (quoted in Goldberg 1996, 175) has since 1949 approved conventions that address issues related to women workers and migrant workers. Among them are: the Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97); the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Conventions, 1975 (No. 143); the Forced Labour Convention (No. 29); the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention (No. 87); the Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100); the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (No. 111); the Minimum Age Convention (No.38); and the Resolution concerning the Conditions of Employment of Domestic Workers, 1965 (Goldberg 1996; The People’s Movement for Human Rights Education 2003).


Although these international covenants are not always legally binding and are not solutions in themselves to the issues of migrants and labor migration, they are important nonetheless in compelling both sending and receiving states to ensure the protection of migrants and to adhere to a set of laws that are accepted to the international community.


Research on Filipina Migrant Workers and Academic Debate in the West

Western academic interest in the phenomenon of female labor migration from the Philippines may be seen in various essays published in different academic journals based in North America. One fine example is the volume edited by Filomeno V. Aguilar, Jr., and published in the Philippines by the Philippine Social Science Council. Filipinos in Global Migrations: At Home in the World? (2002) is a collection of essays previously published in international journals which are not readily available in the Philippines. Aguilar’s introduction, “Beyond Stereotypes: Human Subjectivity in the Structuring of Global Migrations,” contextualizes the recent phenomenon of labor migration within the history of “formal and informal structures and networks of migration” as well as the socio-political forces that determine and affect migration on the global plane. The collection, by way of the introduction, also asserts that migrants are “not passive victim[s] of structures, but [are persons] with human agency and subjectivity who [are] able to navigate through and negotiate with formidable structural forces” (Aguilar 2002, 2).


The following essays in the collection are significant for this review. “From Registered Nurse to Registered Nanny: Discursive Geographies of Filipina Domestic Workers in Vancouver, B.C.,” by Geraldine Pratt, examines discursive constructions of “Filipina” as these are lived out by Filipinas in Vancouver. Using poststructuralist theories of the subject and discourse analysis, the essay looks into how workers come into an understanding of their conditions, given the restrictions placed on them by their work and immigration status. Five other essays present valuable research on overseas Filipino domestic workers: “Sexuality and Discipline among Filipina Domestic Workers in Hong Kong,” by Nicole Constable; “Domestic Bodies of the Philippines,” by Neferti Tadiar; “Stress Factors and Mental Health Adjustment of Filipino Domestic Workers in Hong Kong,” by Christopher Bagely, Susan Madrid, and Floyd Bolitho; “Romancing Resistance and Resisting Romance: Ethnography and the Construction of Power in the Filipina Domestic Worker Community in Hong Kong,” by Julian McAllister Groves and Kimberly A. Chang; and “At Home But Not at Home: Filipina Narratives of Ambivalent Returns,” by Nicole Constable.


Based on her doctoral dissertation, Nicole Constable’s Maid to Order in Hong Kong: Stories of Filipina Workers (1997) draws from the insights of Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci on power, resistance, and accommodation to demonstrate that household workers do not just passively give in to the authority of the employer and to their poor working conditions. By centering on human agency and assuming individuals to be free agents in society, it argues that these workers subvert and resist the dominant power relations around them. Maid to Order looks at power and resistance as these are performed by Filipina domestic workers in Hong Kong.


Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration and Domestic Work (2001) by Rhacel Salazar Parreñas is an ethnographic account of the lives of Filipino domestic workers in Rome and Los Angeles. These workers do the menial tasks that local women have renounced for more “productive” work. The book analyses, at the level of the subject, the costs of labor migration to women who “leave behind their families to do the mothering and care taking work of the global economy in countries throughout the world.”


A book that is outstanding in spelling out interconnections between migrant labor, sending and receiving countries’ migration programs, and globalization and the impact of these on the lives of individual workers is Bridget Anderson’s Doing the Dirty Work? The Global Politics of Domestic Labour (2000). This study includes research on Filipina domestic workers based in Europe and analyzes the dynamics of class and race in the global market. Despite the common denominator of gender, this incisive research scrutinizes the politics of race in paid domestic work in the West as it challenges feminist principles of equality, even the notion of “sisterhood.”


Two studies from the Institute of Social Studies at the Hague are available in research centers in the Philippines: Mary Alice P. Gonzales’ Filipino Migrant Women in the Netherlands (1998) and Marilen Abesamis’ “Romance and Resistance: The Experience of Filipina Domestic Workers in Hong Kong” (1999).


The current phenomenon of female labor migration has also spawned academic debate that largely centers on the efficacy of postmodern theories in feminist research on the plight of Filipina labor migrants. In “Imperialism, Female Diaspora, and Feminism,” Delia Aguilar interrogates the significance of such theories as well as posing a challenge about the state of the women’s movement in the United States.


Notwithstanding the importance of analyzing the impact of the current wave of labor diaspora on the level of the individual, international labor migration is undoubtedly a development concern. At issue is the unequal distribution of resources and opportunities at the national and global levels, which force people to migrate. Undeniably, the current wave of international migration is intricately linked to the existing economic model of globalization that fails to improve the life chances of the great majority of people.



Odine de Guzman is an assistant professor in the Department of English & Comparative Literature at the University of the Philippines, Diliman. She is the editor of Body Politics: Essays on Cultural Representations of Women’s Bodies (2002) and From Saudi with Love: Poems by OFWs (2003). Research for the section “Migration in the Region” was conducted while she was on fellowship at IKMAS, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, under the Southeast Asian Scholars and Public Intellectuals Fellowship (SEAF) Program in 2001.


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Laguindam, Imelda L. 1988. “Letter to President Corazon C. Aquino.” Letter of the United Filipinos in Hong Kong, Feb 7. In “The Manila Ban on Maids: Boon or Bane? A Documentation.”


Manila Bulletin. 2000. “President seeks continued OFW support.” Dec 10: 1, 8.


Migrants Rights International. 2003. “International Law on Migrants’ Rights Protection Enters Into Force.” http://www.migrantwatch.org/, Sept 23, 2003.


National Statistical Coordination Board. 2000. “Results of the July 2000 Labor Force Survey in the Philippines.” http://www.nscb.gov.ph


Nguyen Ngoc Quyuh. 2000. “Labor Migration in Vietnam.” Asian Migrant 13, no. 3 (Jul-Sept): 87-89.


Ocampo, F. T. 1988. “The Ban on Domestics.” Philippine Daily Inquirer, Jan 29: 5.


Orozco, Wilhelmina S. 1985. “Economic Refugees Voyage of the Commoditized: An Alternative Philippine Report on Migrant Women Workers.” Quezon City: Philippine Women’s Research Collective monograph


Osteria, Trinidad S. 1994. Filipino Female Labor Migration to Japan: Economic Causes and Consequences. Manila: De La Salle University Press.


Palma-Beltran, Mary Ruby, and Aurora Javate De Dios, eds. 1992. Filipino Women Overseas Contract Workers: At What Cost? Manila: Goodwill Trading Co., Inc.


Parreñas, Rhacel Salazar. 2001. Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration and Domestic Work. California: Stanford University Press. Reprinted in the Philippines by the Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003.


Perez, Aurora E., and Perla C. Patacsil. 1998. Philippine Migration Studies: An Annotated Bibliography. Quezon City: Philippine Migration Research Network.


POEA InfoCenter. 2002. “Deployment of Land-based Newly Hired OFWs By Skills Category and Sex, 1992” (Tables 1992 to 2001). Updated September 9, 2002. Mandaluyong City: Republic of the Philippines, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, c. 2000-2001. http://www.poea.gov.ph/stats/st_dlbnh_sex92-2001.html, Jan 26, 2003.


Ponnampalam, Lingam. 2000. “Mirror or Mold: Newspaper Reportage on Unskilled Labor Migration in Singapore.” Asian Migrant 13, no. 3 (Jul-Sept): 75-80.


Republic of the Philippines. 1996. “Republic Act No. 8042: Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.”


Sivahalan, E. 2000. “Media Reporting on Labor Migration: The Malaysian Experience.” Asian Migrant 13, no. 3 (Jul-Sept): 81-86.


Sta. Maria, Amparita S., Gilbert V. Sembrano, and Ma. Glenda R. Ramirez. 1999. Filipino Migrant Workers in Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei: What They Need to Know – And What They Have to Tell. Makati: Ateneo Human Rights Center.


Stalker, Peter. 1994. The Work of Strangers: A Survey of International Labour Migration. Geneva: International Labour Organization.


_____. 2000. Workers Without Frontiers: The Impact of Globalization on International Migration. Geneva: International Labour Organization/Lynne Rienner.


Sukamdi, Abdul Harris, and Patrick Brownlee, eds. 2000. Labour Migration in Indonesia: Policies and Practices. Yogyakarta: Population Studies Center, Gadjah Mada University.


The People’s Movement for Human Rights Education (PDHRE) / NY Office. “The Human Rights of Migrant Workers.” http://www.pdhre.org/rights/migrants.html, Sept 23, 2003.


The United Filipinos Against the Ban. 1988. “Press Statement.” February 28. In “The Manila Ban on Maids: Boon or Bane? A Documentation.”


Tirtosudarmo, Riwaanto, and Romdiati Haning. 1998. A Needs Assessment Concerning Indonesian Women Migrant Workers to Saudi Arabia. Jakarta: Center for Population and Manpower Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences.


Wong, Diana. 1996. “Foreign Domestic Workers in Singapore.” In Asian Women in Migration, ed. Graziano Battistella and Anthony Paganoni. Quezon City: Scalabrini Migration Center.


Yap Mui Teng. 2000. “Labor Migration in Singapore: Policy and the Role of the Media.” Asian Migrant 13, no. 3 (Jul-Sept): 68-74.


Selected Research Centers and Organizations


Asian Migrant Centre (AMC), 9F Lee Kong Comm. Bldg., 115 Woosung St., Yau Ma Tei, Kowloon, Hong Kong SAR, China, amc@asian-migrants.org http://www.asian-migrants.org/


Asian Network for Women and International Migration (ANWIM), Asian and Pacific Development Centre, P.O.Box 12224, Pesiaran Duta, 50770 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, gad@pc.jaring.my


Asian Partnership on International Migration (APIM), c/o United Nations Development Programme, Wisma UN, Blok C, Kompleks Pejabat Damansara, Jalan Dungun, Damansara Heights, 50490 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, apim@tm.net.my http://www.apim.apdip.net/


Asia Pacific Migration Research Network (APMRN), Secretariat c/o CAPSTRANS Migration & Multicultural Studies, Institute of Social Change and Critical Inquiry, University of Wollongong, Australia, apmrn@uow.edu.au


Kanlungan Center Foundation, Inc., 77 K-10th St., Kamias, 1102 Quezon City, Philippines, kcfi@philonline.com.ph, http://www.kanlungan.ngo.ph


Management of Social Transformation Programme (MOST), http://www.unesco.org/most/welcome.htm

Migrant Forum in Asia (MFA), Regional Secretariat, c/o Unlad Kabayan, 9-B Mayumi St., UP Teachers’ Village, Quezon City, Philippines, mfa@pacific.net.hk http://www.migrantnet.pair.com


Scalabrini Migration Center (SMC), P.O. Box 10541, Broadway Centrum, 1113 Quezon City, Philippines, smc@skyinet.net, http://www.skyinet.net/~smc


TENAGANITA, 11th Floor, Wisma Yakin, Jalan Masjid India, 50100 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, tnita@hotmail.com, http://caramasia.gn.apc.org/tn_page0.html


The Network Opposed to Violence Against Women Migrants (NOVA), c/o Kanlungan Center Foundation


The Philippine Migration Research Network (PMRN), Philippine Social Science Center UP Post Office Box 205 Diliman, Quezon City 1101 Philippines tsis.section@skyinet.net / pssc@skyinet.net



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[1] See, for example, Today’s article on Anita Fernando and Marivic David, 28 September 1996; J.T. Burgonio, “Jailed Pinay home to hero’s welcome,” Philippine Daily Inquirer (hereafter PDI), August 17, 2001, p. A6; Fernando del Mundo, “RP’s new heroes subjected to abuse,” PDI, January 7, 2002, pp. A1 & A15; AP, “HK man convicted for scalding RP maid,” PDI, March 20, 2002, p. A4; Dennis Estopace, “NGO calls for gov’t to address trauma of forced OFW repatriation,” Cyberdyaryo, http://cyberdyaryo.com/features/f2002_0426_02.htm, Aug 17, 2002; A.D. McKenzie, “Literature: Eating Curses, Breathing Humiliation,” IPS: The Philippine Migration Trail, http://www.ips.org/migration/1304.html, Aug 17, 2002.

[2] Rhea delos Santos, “Overseas Filipino Workers: Migrant Workers Act fails to protect overseas Filipinos workers,” IBON Features (IBON Foundation Inc., 2002), http://www.ibon.org/news/if/01/28.htm, Jan 26, 2003.

[3] Some parts of this section are revised and updated data from my essay published in Women and Gender Relations in the Philippines: Selected Readings in Women’s Studies, vol. 1, ed. Jeanne Frances I. Illo (Quezon City: Women’s Studies Association of the Philippines, 1999).

[4] See David Lazarus, “Factors that led to Manila’s ban on maids,” New Straits Times (March 1, 1988); “Ban on maids may be lifted if…,” Malay Mail (March 2, 1988); “Ban on Filipina maids may affect lifestyle,” New Strait Times (February 29, 1988); “Cory defends ban on Filipino maids,” New Straits Times (Feb. 9, 1988); Felix delos Santos, “Ban on maids assailed,” Philippine Star (Feb 1, 1988); F.T. Ocampo, “The ban on domestics,” Philippine Daily Inquirer (Jan 29, 1988) all compiled in “The Manila Ban on Maids” by the Center for Migrant Workers, Bukit Nanas Heights, Kuala Lumpur.

[5] Based on reports of members of FGCC, a Christian Ministry based in Kuala Lumpur, who attended the welcome dinner in honor of the president.

[6] Business News, 14 June 2000, quoted in Eko Susi Rosdianasari.

[7] Immigration Laws 1995, Paul Jacob, news reports from Straits Times, April 19,1995 and Xinhua News Agency, April 18, 1995.




from :Kyoto Review